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The “sharing economy” goes by many names such as the “gig 
economy,” the “1099 economy,” and the “on-demand economy,”1 all of 
which describe the economic system that uses online platforms to connect 
workers and sellers with clients and consumers, primarily through 
smartphone applications.2 Many of the sharing economy companies are 
also called the “tech disruptors.”3 They earned this title because they have 
changed the way that people do business.4 But in changing the way that 
people do business, they have also created unique regulatory challenges 
for governments across the country. The news is rife with stories about 
when these regulations go wrong. For example, tenants have been evicted 
from their apartments in many cities for renting their apartments through 
the “home sharing” company Airbnb.5 Another example is the standoff 
between Uber and Lyft against the City of Austin over a law requiring 
drivers to pass a background check before they can operate in the city, 
resulting in Uber and Lyft ceasing operations in Austin and costing 10,000 
drivers their jobs.6 In response to these stories, some governments have 
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begun experimenting with innovative solutions to the unique regulatory 
challenges created by the sharing economy. 
One solution that stands out is the ordinance adopted by the City of 
Seattle.7 Seattle’s ordinance created a system that allows Uber and Lyft 
drivers to create a union to collectively bargain with their “driver 
coordinators.”8 Seattle’s ordinance is an innovative attempt to solve the 
problem of how to classify sharing economy workers, which has plagued 
local governments and courts across the country.9 Companies like Uber 
claim that the workers who use their platforms are “independent 
contractors” rather than employees.10 By being classified as independent 
contractors, workers lose many of the rights and privileges that employees 
have, including the right to form unions and collectively bargain without 
risk of federal antitrust liability.11 While many local governments have 
attempted to challenge the way Uber classifies its workers directly, 
Seattle’s ordinance is unique in that it bypasses the issue of classification 
by allowing drivers to collectively bargain regardless of their worker 
status.12 However, it is possible that Seattle’s ordinance itself violates 
federal antitrust law. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has already sued on 
behalf of Uber in federal district court, but the case was dismissed without 
prejudice for lack of standing.13 Proponents of the ordinance say that it is 
protected under state action immunity, which recognizes that action is 
permissible despite violating federal antitrust law if it is in pursuit of a 
specific state policy.14 However, to date, the Washington legislature has 
made no effort to support Seattle’s unique ordinance. 
This Note will explore the labor issues presented by the sharing 
economy before taking a deeper look into the terms and viability of 
Seattle’s innovative ordinance. Section I of this Note will provide an 
overview of the sharing economy and labor relations within the sharing 
economy. Section II will explore some of the ways in which Uber’s worker 
classification has been challenged throughout the country, focusing 
primarily on the class action lawsuit Uber settled in 2016.15 Section III will 
discuss the specifics of Seattle’s ordinance and the challenges to the 
ordinance raised by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Finally, Section IV 
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will discuss the state action doctrine as a defense to federal antitrust law 
before determining whether the ordinance would survive federal antitrust 
scrutiny under the state action doctrine. Ultimately, this Note will 
conclude that Seattle’s ordinance, as written, would not survive an 
antitrust challenge under the state action doctrine. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY AND LABOR RELATIONS 
The most widely recognized sharing economy companies are the 
“ride share” companies, such as Uber and Lyft. However, there are many 
other sharing economy companies, such as Airbnb, Postmates, Etsy, and 
even Ebay.16 Although sharing economy companies are relatively new, the 
global market for sharing economy companies is growing at an extremely 
fast rate.17 For example, the number of Uber drivers doubled every six 
months between 2013 and 2015.18 In 2013, the global sharing economy 
market was valued at $26 billion, and it is expected to grow to $110 billion 
in the near future.19 
Much of the sharing economy’s success can be attributed to the 
consumers and the workers. Consumers cite ease of use, convenience, and 
competitive pricing as reasons why they choose to do business with 
sharing economy companies.20 Workers, on the other hand, are attracted 
to the compensation and flexible schedules that sharing economy 
companies advertise to potential workers.21 
On the surface, the sharing economy seems great for everyone 
involved. A quick Google search shows Lyft boasting that drivers can 
make as much as $35 an hour.22 Further, Uber’s website advertises 
potential income and flexible schedules as reasons for drivers to “partner” 
with Uber.23 Yet, it has become increasingly clear that the realities 
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experienced by sharing economy workers are vastly different from what 
the companies advertise.24 
To begin, many sharing economy workers find that the compensation 
is not as good as advertised because of the unpaid time spent waiting for 
“jobs” from the platform and business expenses that are not covered by 
the platform.25 For example, between the time lost waiting for and picking 
up a rider, vehicle maintenance costs, insurance fees, and gas expenses, 
Uber drivers are making less than minimum wage in many cities.26 As one 
Uber driver put it, “[after driving 10 minutes to pick up a fare, spending 5 
to 10 minutes waiting for the passenger, and a 10-minute ride] ‘before car 
depreciation and insurance, I end up with $3.60 from [a fare of] $8. If we 
look at it by hour, that will be $7.20.’”27 In addition, the companies take a 
cut from each fare, further decreasing the amount that a worker will take 
home at the end of the day.28 
Many sharing economy workers also find that other promises made 
to them are not realized. First, workers find that their schedules are not as 
flexible as the companies advertise.29 While the workers can theoretically 
work whenever they want, many of the companies find ways to incentivize 
workers to work at certain times.30 For example, Uber increases its fares 
during times of high demand in a practice that is called “surge pricing.”31 
Second, because of the compensation issues listed above, sharing 
economy workers often must put in long hours that extend beyond the 
standard eight-hour workday in order to make a sufficient amount of 
money.32 Finally, some sharing economy companies have implemented 
ways to penalize workers who do not work for the platform often enough.33 
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For example, Uber may unilaterally terminate a driver’s account if the 
driver has not accepted enough rides.34 
Many of the sharing economy workers’ problems stem from the fact 
that the companies classify the workers as “independent contractors” 
rather than employees.35 Under federal labor law, employers generally 
have considerable incentive to classify workers as independent 
contractors, while the workers lose certain labor rights as a result.36 From 
a purely financial standpoint, companies benefit from classifying workers 
as independent contractors because independent contractors have no 
statutory right to minimum wage, overtime pay, compensation for injuries 
sustained on the job, and unemployment insurance.37 Independent 
contractors are also not protected by federal labor and employment laws 
that impose legal obligations on the employer, such as the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.38 Finally, independent contractors have no federally protected right to 
form unions and collectively bargain with their employers; thus, 
independent contractors are denied one of the key powers that workers 
have to address issues with their employers.39 In the sharing economy, the 
disadvantages workers face by being classified as independent contractors 
are exacerbated by the fact that sharing economy workers frequently 
perform jobs in isolation from one another. As a result, they are unable to 
share concerns with other workers or address issues with supervisors face-
to-face, like they could in a more tradition brick-and-mortar workplace.40 
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In short, sharing economy workers lose many labor rights by being 
classified as independent contractors, while also lacking economic power 
to bargain with the platforms through which they operate. 
II. CHALLENGES TO SHARING ECONOMY WORKER CLASSIFICATION 
With the problems faced by sharing economy workers becoming 
increasingly apparent to legislatures, state and local governments across 
the United States have attempted to find solutions to the worker 
classification issue.41 Facing regulation, sharing economy companies often 
default to the argument that they are not employers because they are 
merely offering an online platform that connects workers—or independent 
entrepreneurs—to consumers.42 Critics of this argument point out that the 
sharing economy companies still manage their workers as if they were 
employees in various ways, such as unilaterally setting rates for services; 
dictating how the services are provided; and screening, testing, training, 
evaluating, promoting, and disciplining the workers based on standards set 
by the companies.43 
Despite pushback from the sharing economy companies, local 
governments have successfully regulated in favor of the workers in a 
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handful of situations. For example, the Florida Department of Economic 
Opportunity found that an Uber driver was eligible for unemployment 
insurance as an employee of Uber.44 Similarly, the California Labor 
Commission found that an Uber driver was entitled to reimbursement for 
certain expenses incurred while driving for Uber because he was an 
employee and not an independent contractor.45 However, these examples 
are relatively small, localized successes for individual Uber drivers 
challenging their worker classification compared to the class action case 
Uber settled in April 2016. 
In 2013, Uber drivers filed a class action law suit in federal district 
court for the Northern District of California alleging that they had been 
misclassified as independent contractors by Uber.46 In standard class 
action fashion, Uber responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that it 
is a “technology company” rather than a “transportation company”; thus, 
the drivers are, in fact, independent contractors using Uber’s services to 
contact riders.47 Judge Edward M. Chen denied Uber’s motion on March 
11, 2015, holding “that whether an individual should ultimately be 
classified as an employee or an independent contractor under California 
law presents a mixed question of law and fact that must typically be 
resolved by a jury.”48 
Nevertheless, Judge Chen still discussed the merits of the case at 
some length, poking holes in much of Uber’s argument that it is merely a 
technology company and finding that Uber’s argument was “fatally flawed 
in numerous respects.”49 To begin, the court found that simply because 
Uber is a “technologically advanced transportation company,” does not 
make it a technology company.50 The court elaborated: “Uber is no more 
a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’ 
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs.”51 The court also 
determined that Uber would not be a viable business entity without its 
drivers because it depends on revenue generated from rides given by its 
drivers and not revenue from software sales.52 Finally, the court found that 
Uber exercises a significant amount of control over its drivers by 
unilaterally setting the rates it charges its riders, by requiring potential 
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drivers to meet certain qualifications before they can work for Uber, and 
by reserving the right to terminate drivers’ accounts.53 
Despite the court’s strongly worded opinion denying the motion to 
dismiss, the question of whether Uber drivers are employees or 
independent contractors was ultimately left to be determined by a jury.54 
In April 2016, with the trial only a month away, the Ninth Circuit granted 
Uber’s request for an emergency appeal of the district court’s finding that 
Uber’s binding arbitration clause was unenforceable.55 At this point, the 
combination of the concerns that the drivers would lose their class 
certification and that a jury might find that Uber drivers are independent 
contractors, especially with Uber having the home field advantage in San 
Francisco, led the parties to settle.56 Uber made some major concessions 
to the drivers in the settlement, including a $100 million settlement to be 
split among 340,000 drivers in California and Massachusetts, agreeing to 
meet with a “Driver Association” once a quarter, agreeing to no longer 
deactivate drivers’ accounts without just cause, and permitting drivers to 
collect tips.57 Nevertheless, the drivers ultimately agreed to continue being 
classified as independent contractors, and the issue was never addressed 
in a federal court.58 
In the aftermath of the settlement, drivers in New York City formed 
an “Independent Driver’s Guild.”59 Although the guild does not afford the 
drivers the same collective bargaining rights as an official labor union—
such as bargaining over fares, commissions, and benefits—Uber agreed to 
support and work with the guild to quell some of the driver unrest.60 
III. SEATTLE’S INNOVATIVE ORDINANCE 
A. Terms of the Ordinance 
While the class action lawsuit was still pending, the Seattle City 
Council passed a unique ordinance allowing Uber drivers to collectively 
bargain regardless of their classification, effectively avoiding the worker 
classification issues.61 In December 2015, the Seattle City Council adopted 
Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 6.310, which provides a framework for 
                                                     
 53. Id. at 1142–43. 
 54. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1006. 
 55. Id. at 1007. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 1007–08. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Douglas MacMillan, Uber Agrees to Work With a Guild for Its Drivers in New York City, 
WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2016 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-agrees-to-work-with-a-
guild-for-its-drivers-in-new-york-city-1462913669. 
 61. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1010. 
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drivers to form a union, or an “exclusive driver representative” (EDR).62 
Although SMC 6.310 was clearly adopted in response to the sharing 
economy ride sharing companies, or “transport network companies” 
(TNC)—like Uber and Lyft—the Code extends to all “driver 
coordinators” in the city of Seattle, including taxicab associations and for-
hire vehicle companies.63 
Under the ordinance, an entity must go through a somewhat 
complicated process before it can be established as an EDR. To begin, an 
entity must seek designation as a “qualified driver representative” (QDR) 
from Seattle’s Director of Finance and Administrative Services 
(Director).64 The designation of QDR status is subject to three conditions: 
(1) The entity must be registered as a nonprofit entity with the Washington 
Secretary of State; (2) the entity’s bylaws must give drivers the right to be 
members of the organization and participate in democratic control of the 
organization; and (3) the entity must have experience in assisting 
steakholders in reaching consensus agreements with employers and 
contractors, a demonstrated commitment to assisting stakeholders in 
reaching consensus agreements with employers and contractors, or both.65 
A QDR can then move to be certified as an EDR by the Director upon 
showing that it has the support, in the form of a physical or electronic 
signature, from a majority of “qualified drivers” with a particular driver 
coordinator.66 
Although there could be multiple QDRs, the EDR would represent 
all drivers for a particular driver coordinator once the EDR is designated.67 
Under the ordinance, the EDR will have the power to meet and negotiate 
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with the driver coordinator about subjects including, but not limited to, 
“vehicle equipment standards; safe driving practices; the manner in which 
the driver coordinator will conduct criminal background checks of all 
prospective drivers; the nature and amount of payments to be made by, or 
withheld from, the driver coordinator to or by the drivers; minimum hours 
of work, conditions of work, and applicable rules.”68 Any agreement made 
between the EDR and driver coordinator would be binding upon approval 
of the Director, who would review the agreement in order “to ensure that 
the substance of the agreement promotes the provision of safe, reliable, 
and economical for-hire transportation services and otherwise advance[s] 
the public policy goals set forth in Chapter 6.310.”69 
B. First Challenge to the Ordinance 
The ride share companies did little to fight the adoption of 
SMC 6.310, and it was approved by a unanimous vote of the Seattle City 
Council.70 However, once the ordinance was adopted, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce sued the City of Seattle on behalf of Uber and Eastside for 
Hire, Inc., a local Seattle transportation company.71 The Chamber of 
Commerce made two predictable allegations. First, that SMC 6.310 is 
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act,72 which the Supreme 
Court has interpreted to exclude independent contractors from collective 
bargaining.73 Second, that SMC 6.310 violates and is preempted by 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which reads “a contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States . . . is illegal.”74 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted Section 1 to mean that independent contractors are 
forbidden from colluding on the prices they would accept for their services 
or otherwise engaging in concerted anticompetitive action in the 
marketplace.75 
A federal district court judge for the Western District of Washington, 
Judge Lasnik, dismissed the case for lack of standing on two grounds.76 
First, the Chamber of Commerce was unable to show that the companies 
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would sustain future injury under the provision of SMC 6.310 that allows 
QDRs to acquire driver contact information from companies in order to 
promote themselves to the drivers.77 The court found that Chamber of 
Commerce was unable to show standing under this provision because it is 
equally as likely that a QDR would use other means to market to drivers.78 
Second, the court found that the companies were not injured by having to 
incur certain costs as a result of the ordinance, including hiring organized 
labor consultants, because companies cannot “manufacture standing 
merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of 
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”79 Ultimately, the 
first challenge to Seattle’s ordinance was dismissed without prejudice. 
C. Second Challenge to the Ordinance 
The Chamber of Commerce refiled its lawsuit when the City of 
Seattle granted QDR status to the Teamster’s Local 117 in March 2017.80 
Pursuant to Seattle’s ordinance, the establishment of a QDR meant that 
Uber and Lyft, along with any other driver coordinator in Seattle, would 
have had to give the Teamsters drivers’ contact information by April 
2017.81 Believing the establishment of a QDR provided the requisite 
standing, the Chamber of Commerce promptly refiled its lawsuit against 
the City of Seattle.82 The Chamber of Commerce was joined by a separate 
lawsuit from about a dozen Uber and Lyft drivers who are also opposed to 
Seattle’s ordinance.83 
This time, Judge Lasnik sided with the Chamber of Commerce, not 
only finding that the Chamber of Commerce had standing, but also 
granting a preliminary injunction against Seattle’s ordinance.84 In granting 
a preliminary injunction, the court needed to find, among other factors, 
that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of the case and that the 
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary relief.85 Judge 
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Lasnik made it clear in his opinion that “this Order should not be read as 
a harbinger of what the ultimate decision in this case will be.”86 
Nevertheless, the Chamber of Commerce succeeded in preventing Uber 
and Lyft from having to give up their driver information until the merits 
of the case can be litigated. 
For the time being, Seattle’s ordinance hangs in limbo. Opponents of 
the Ordinance remain confident that it violates federal antitrust law. After 
the court’s dismissal, the Chamber of Commerce stated that Seattle has 
merely “delayed coming to grips with the legal flaws at the heart of this 
ordinance.”87 On the other hand, supporters of the ordinance believe it is 
legal because of the “state action doctrine” exception to federal antitrust 
law.88 
IV. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
A. Overview 
The state action doctrine—also referred to as Parker immunity—was 
first established by the landmark Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown in 
1943.89 In Parker, the Court upheld the California Agricultural Prorate 
Act, which was enacted to limit the amount of agricultural goods produced 
in California in order to “conserve the agricultural wealth of the state.”90 
The Court held that “[w]e find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act 
or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or 
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.”91 
Nevertheless, the Court did not articulate a clear state action doctrine test 
until it decided California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc. forty years after Parker.  
In Midcal, the Court created a two-prong test for determining 
whether a particular private action qualifies for state action immunity.92 
Under the first prong of the Midcal test, the challenged action must be 
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.”93 Under 
the second prong of the test, the action must be actively supervised by the 
state itself.94 In Midcal, the Court ultimately found that a statute that 
required wine producers to set prices through a fair-trade contract in 
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California did not qualify for state action immunity because the program 
was not actively supervised by the state.95  
State action immunity is a key exception to federal antitrust law 
because it permits states to pursue specific public policy objectives 
without federal oversight.96 Relying on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty, the Court has consistently held that requiring states to 
conform to the Sherman Antitrust Act would “impose an impermissible 
burden on the States’ power to regulate.”97 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has stated that finding state action immunity is disfavored.98 
B. State Action Immunity Applied to Seattle’s Ordinance 
It is unlikely that Seattle’s innovative ordinance allowing ride share 
drivers to form unions would pass the Midcal test. Although the ordinance 
would likely survive the second prong of the test, it is unlikely it would 
pass the first prong of the test. 
Seattle has the easiest argument under the second prong of the test, 
which requires that the action in question must be supervised by the state. 
A court would likely find that the ordinance satisfies the state supervision 
requirement. The policy behind the state supervision requirement is to 
ensure that a private entity does not use state action immunity to engage 
in anticompetitive action in order to pursue its own interests.99 For 
example, in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the 
court found that a Board of Dentists who were ordering non-dentists to 
cease performing teeth whitening services were not protected by the state 
action doctrine, despite being granted broad administrative powers by the 
state of North Carolina.100 The Court found that there was no state 
supervision in this case because the Board was made up primarily of 
market participants and, as such, the Board could not meet the state 
supervision requirement by supervising itself.101 
Seattle’s ordinance requires that the Director of Finance and 
Administrative Services be active in every aspect of the process under 
SMC 6.310, including approving the designation of the QDR and EDR 
and approving any agreements between the EDR and driver coordinator.102 
Thus, a court would likely find that supervision by the director would 
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satisfy the state supervision prong if it found that the city satisfied the first 
prong of the Midcal test.103 
However, it is the first prong of the Midcal test that presents the 
biggest hurdle for Seattle’s ordinance. The first prong of the Midcal test 
requires that the challenged action be enacted in pursuit of a clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.104 In some cases 
following Midcal, the Supreme Court has seemingly relaxed the clear 
articulation test to mean that the anticompetitive effect of the regulation 
need only be the “foreseeable result” of what a state legislature 
authorized.105 However, in a recent decision, the Court indicated that it 
may be returning to the more stringent interpretation of the clear 
articulation test.106 
In Hallie, the Court was tasked with determining whether the City of 
Eau Claire, which had the only sewage treatment facility in the area, 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by refusing sewage services to 
surrounding towns unless individual landowners agreed to be annexed by 
the City of Eau Claire.107 The Court found that by enacting a statute that 
permitted municipalities to limit the area in which they provide sewage 
services with no obligation to provide services beyond the delineated area, 
the Wisconsin Legislature contemplated that a city may engage in 
anticompetitive conduct.108 Therefore, the state action doctrine allowed the 
City of Eau Claire to refuse service to surrounding towns unless the 
individual homeowners agreed to be annexed by the City.109 Similarly, in 
City of Columbia v. Omni Advertising, Inc., the Court found that state 
action immunity protected the City of Columbia’s ability to enact zoning 
ordinances in order to restrict new billboard construction because the very 
purpose of zoning regulation is to regulate business freedom.110 In both 
cases, the Court found that state action immunity applied because the 
challenged actions were a foreseeable result of the legislation in question. 
However, more recently, the Court seemed to return to the more 
stringent interpretation of the clear articulation test. In Phoebe Putney, the 
Court held that a Georgia law that created public entities called hospital 
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authorities—which had broad corporate powers, including the power to 
acquire hospitals—was not sufficient to satisfy the clear articulation test 
and allow the hospital authorities to engage in anticompetitive conduct.111 
The intent of the law was to create organizations that would improve the 
treatment of Georgia’s indigent sick.112 When the law was first enacted in 
1941, the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County acquired 
Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, as was permitted under the law.113 
Antitrust claims were triggered in 2010, however, when the Hospital 
Authority began to contemplate acquiring the only other hospital in the 
county, creating a hospital monopoly in the area.114 The Supreme Court 
determined that the acquisition of the second hospital by the Hospital 
Authority failed the clear articulation test and, therefore, lacked state 
action immunity because “a State that has delegated such general powers 
‘can hardly be said to have contemplated’ that they will be used 
anticompetitively.”115 In its holding in Phoebe Putney, then, the Court 
suggests that it is moving away from the more lenient “foreseeable result” 
test in favor of the more stringent “clear articulation” test established by 
Midcal. 
In order to uphold Seattle’s ordinance, a court would have to find that 
the ordinance was at least a foreseeable result of the powers granted to the 
City of Seattle by the State of Washington and was at most a clearly 
articulated power of the City of Seattle. The Washington statute that gives 
the City of Seattle power to regulate privately operated taxicab 
transportation services, including the ride share companies, allows 
Washington cities to do the following: 
(1) Regulat[e] entry into the business of providing taxicab 
transportation services; (2) Requir[e] a license to be purchased as 
a condition of operating a taxicab and the right to revoke, cancel, 
or refuse to reissue a license for failure to comply with regulatory 
requirements; (3) Control[] the rates charged for providing taxicab 
transportation service and the manner in which rates are calculated 
and collected, including the establishment of zones as the basis for 
rates; (4) Regulat[e] the routes of taxicabs, including restricting 
access to airports; (5) Establish[] safety, equipment, and insurance 
requirements; and (6) Any other requirements adopted to ensure 
safe and reliable taxicab service.116 
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Given this statutory language, it would be difficult for the City of 
Seattle to argue that the Washington Legislature contemplated that Seattle 
would engage in the regulation of workers in the transportation industry. 
The statute clearly articulates the powers Seattle has to regulate aspects of 
transportation companies’ relationships with consumers—for example, 
fares, routes, and safety—but is silent as to the relationships between the 
companies and their drivers. Thus, the ordinance would fail the clear 
articulation test. 
In the alternative, a court may analyze Seattle’s ordinance under the 
slightly less stringent “foreseeable result” test. Under this test, the court 
would need to determine whether Seattle’s ordinance was a foreseeable 
result of the Washington statute. However, the ordinance would also likely 
fail under this test because, as Judge Lasnik aptly pointed out in granting 
the preliminary injunction against the City of Seattle, similar statutes 
regulating the transportation industry are fairly common, but they have 
never been used to regulate the relationship between the companies and 
their drivers.117 Ultimately, Seattle’s ordinance would likely fail the clear 
articulation prong of the Midcal test regardless of which standard a court 
would use to analyze it. Thus, it is likely that Seattle’s ordinance would 
not be protected under state action immunity. 
This problem can easily be remedied if the Washington legislature 
chooses to support Seattle by granting it the requisite power to satisfy the 
clear articulation test and qualify for state action immunity. Existing case 
law does not bar a state legislature from retroactively articulating that an 
entity may pursue anticompetitive action. Moreover, the Seattle City 
Council has already completed the difficult task of creating innovative 
legislation to address one of the many regulatory concerns stemming from 
the rise of the sharing economy; all that is left is for the state legislature to 
follow suit. 
CONCLUSION 
Creating a means for drivers to collectively bargain with their driver 
coordinators is only part of the battle; it is still up to the drivers to choose 
to get behind an entity that will allow them to exercise their new power. 
As it stands, the validity of Seattle’s innovative ordinance has yet to be 
determined by federal courts. However, other cities, including New York 
and Cincinnati, have taken notice of Seattle’s unique regulation, and it is 
possible the regulation extending collective bargaining rights to sharing 
economy workers will be seen in other cities soon.118 
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In conclusion, one thing is certain: the sharing economy is not going 
away. New and innovative companies create unique regulatory challenges 
for all levels of government, to which the best response is innovative 
legislation. In enacting SMC 6.310, the Seattle City Council became the 
first government to come up with a creative solution to the worker 
classification issues created by ride share companies like Uber and Lyft. 
A court would likely find that Seattle’s ordinance violates federal antitrust 
law without more support from the State of Washington. Even if the 
ordinance does survive antitrust scrutiny, the creation of a new 
classification of worker, which some experts suggest would be the ideal 
solution,119 or a Supreme Court ruling that finds that drivers are, in fact, 
employees of Uber, would be all that it takes to render Seattle’s ordinance 
obsolete. Nevertheless, Seattle’s unique solution shows that all levels of 
government can and should be more creative in addressing the regulatory 
challenges presented by the sharing economy. 
                                                     
 119. Kennedy, supra note 1. 
